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THE RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE OF 
POSTMODERNISM: A REJOINDER 
Huston Smith 
Accepting Lyotard's "incredulity toward metanarratives" as its definition of 
postmodernism, and Derrida's "openness to the other" as deconstruction's 
contribution to it this essay distinguishes three species of postmodernism: 
minimal (we have no believable metanarratives), mainline (they are unavailable 
in principle), and polemical ("good riddance!"). It then argues that the religious 
impulse challenges all three of these contentions. Contra polemical postmod-
ernism, metanarratives/worldviews are needed. Contra mainline postmod-
ernism, reliable ones are possible. And contra minimal postmodernism, they 
already exist - in the world's great, enduring religious traditions. 
My decision to submit this essay was prompted by the recent issue of this 
journal on "The Religious Significance of Contemporary Continental 
Philosophy" (FP, Vol. 10, No.4, October 1993) which neglected the down-
side of that significance. The essay originated as an address titled 
"Postmodernism and the World's Religions" that was delivered at the 
International Institute for Islamic Thought and Civilization's inaugural 
symposium on "Islam and the Challenge of Modernity," Kuala Lumpur, 
August 1994. In that form it appears - reprinted from the proceedings of 
that symposium - in Walter Truett Anderson (ed.), The Truth about Truth 
(Los Angeles: Jeremy P. Tarcher, 1995). Here I have omitted the references 
to Islam that were specific to its original occasion. I have also aligned it 
closer to the interests of this journal, and given it a new title . 
••• 
In the wake of its traditional and modern periods, the Western world is 
now generally regarded as having become postmodern. And as the entire 
world is still (at this stage) westernizing, I propose in this essay to think 
about postmodernism's bearing, not exclusively on the religions of the 
West but on religion generally. From the innumerable ways in which the 
word postmodern has been and is being used, I select the one that I think 
says most. It will occupy me exclusively. 
Postmodernism as the Collapse of Inclusive Outlooks 
Contrasts tend to throw things into relief, so I shall define the postmod-
ernism I shall be working with by contrasting it with the traditional and 
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modern outlooks that preceded it, using epistemology as my point of access. 
Even today, when traditional peoples want to know where they are -
when they wonder about the ultimate context of their lives and what holds 
final sway over their destinies - they turn to their sacred texts; or in the 
case of oral, tribal peoples to the sacred myths that have been handed 
down to them by their ancestors. Modernity was born when a new source 
of knowledge was discovered, the scientific method. Because its controlled 
experiment enabled scientists to prove their hypotheses, and because those 
proven hypotheses had the power to change the material world dramati-
cally, Westerners turned from revelation to science for the Big Picture. 
Intellectual historians tell us that by the 19th century Westerners were 
already more certain that atoms exist than they were confident of any of 
the distinctive things the Bible speaks of. 
This much is straightforward, but it doesn't explain why Westerners 
aren't still modern rather than postmodern, for science continues to be the 
main support of the Western mind. By headcount, most Westerners proba-
bly are still modern, but I am thinking of frontier thinkers who chart the 
course for decades to come. Those thinkers have ceased to be modern 
because they have seen through the so-called scientific worldview, recog-
nizing it to be not scientific but scientistic. They continue to honor science 
for what it tells us about nature, but as that is not all there is, science cannot 
provide us with a worldview - not a valid one. The most it can show us 
is half of the world, the half where normative and intrinsic values, existen-
tial and ultimate meanings, teleologies, qualities, immaterial realities, and 
beings that are superior to us do not appear.1 
Where, then, do we now turn for an inclusive world view? 
Postmodernism hasn't a clue. And this is its deepest definition. A decade 
ago Jean-FranGois Lyotard targeted "incredulity toward metanarratives" as 
the essence of The Postmodern Condition, and his definition has proved 
durable.' Having deserted revelation for science, the West has now aban-
doned the scientific worldview as well, leaving it without replacement. In 
this it mirrors the current stage of Western science which leaves nature 
unimaged. Before modern science, westerners accepted Aristotle's model 
of the earth as surrounded by concentric, crystalline spheres. Newton 
replaced that model with his image of a clockwork universe, but postmod-
ern, quantum-and-relativity science gives us not a third model of nature 
but no model at all. Nature has become counter-intuitive. Alan Wallace's 
Choosing Reality delineates eight different interpretations of quantum 
physics, all of which can claim the support of physics' proven facts.3 
An analogy can pull all this together. If we think of traditional peoples 
as looking out upon the world through the window of revelation (their 
received myths and sacred texts), the window people turned to in the 
modern period (science) turns out to be stunted. It cuts off at the level of 
the human nose, which (epistemologically speaking) means that when we 
look through science's window our gaze slants downward and we see only 
things that are inferior to us: As for the postmodern window, it is boarded 
over and allows no inclusive view whatsoever. A recent issue of The 
University of Chicago Magazine featured on its cover a photograph of 
Richard Rorty announcing that "There is no Big Pichlre." 
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This conclusion admits of three versions that grow increasingly shrill. 
Minimal, descriptive postmodernism rests its case with the fact that today 
no accepted worldview exists. Mainline, doctrinal postmodernism goes on 
to argue for the permanence of this condition.' Never again will we have a 
worldview of which we can be confident - we know too well how little the 
human mind can know. Members of this camp disagree as to whether real-
ity has a deep structure to be known, but they agree that if it has, the human 
mind is incapable of knowing it. Hardcore, polemical postmodernism goes a 
step further by adding, "Good riddance!" Worldviews oppress. They total-
ize, and in doing so marginalize minorities. Terry Eagleton goes so far as to 
charge them with exercising "a secretly terroristic function."" 
These three postmodern stances set the agenda for the rest of my paper, 
for I want to argue that the world's religions question the last hvo, and quali-
fy importantly the first? Negatively, they deny that inclusive views prepon-
derantly oppress. Positively, they affirm that the human mind is made for 
such views, and that reliable ones already exist. Before I enter upon these 
constructive points, however, I want to take a quick look at recent French 
philosophy. For though it was mostly the unbridled historicism of German 
philosophers - Hegel, Nietzsche, and Heidegger - that paved the way for 
postmodernism, as our century closes it is the French who have taken the 
lead. There is time to mention only one of them, and Jacques Derrida is the 
obvious candidate for being postmodernism's most redoubtable spokesman. 
His deconstruction is said already to be a mummy in Europe, but in America 
no one has succeeded in toppling it from its pedestal where it continues to 
preside, more or less, over the postmodern scene. 
The French Connection: Dcrrida and Deconstruction 
Richard Rorty is a shining exception, but postmodernists in general are 
not given to plain and simple language and deconstructionists read like 
caricatures of that assertion. Derrida calls "stupid" the view that decon-
struction "amounts to saying that there is nothing beyond language,"S but 
whose fault is this when he ensconces "il n'y a pas de hors-texte" (there is 
nothing outside the text) as the virtual motto for his movement.9 Even 
sympathetic interpreters have trouble explaining that slogan. John 
Caputo assures us that Derrida does not "trap us inside the 'chain of signi-
fiers,' in linguistic-subjective idealism, unable to do anything but play 
vainly with linguistic strings"; but a page or two later he reverts to the 
original shibboleth: "there are no things themselves outside textual and 
contextual limits .... " The balance of his sentence doesn't qualify that 
assertion; it shifts to a different issue, the issue of "presence" as he contin-
ues, "[there is] no naked contact with being which somehow shakes loose 
of the coded system which makes notions like the 'things in themselves' 
possible to begin with and which enables speakers to refer to them."'(1 
Small wonder satirists have a field day. "Deconstruction goes well 
beyond right-you-are-if-you-think-you-are," Walt Anderson reports. "Its 
message is closer to wrong you are whatever you think, unless you think 
you're wrong, in which case you may be right - but you don't really 
mean what you think you do anyway."l1 
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I mention this because the costiveness of Derrida's prose makes one 
wonder whether it serves, if not to camouflage a leaky theory, then to 
make it pretentious - where there is so much obscurity, can profundity be 
far behind?12 Schroedinger told us that if you cannot in the end tell every-
body what you are doing your work has been in vain. Let's see how 
deconstruction measures up to that test. 
Derrida insists that contrary to its public image, deconstruction is an 
affirmative project,13 for at heart it is "openness to the other."14 One imme-
diately wonders why (if the project is open and affirmative) Derrida faults 
negative theology for "still making a positive point'?' It looks like he is 
open to "others" that he agrees with and not the rest, but let that pass. 
John Caputo (whose exposition of Derrida I am relying on primarily in this 
essay) glosses deconstructive openness as follows: 
Oerrida's thought is through and through a philosophy of "alteri-
ty," ... a relentless attentiveness and sensitivity to the 'other.' [It] 
stands for a kind of hyper-sensitivity to many "others"; the other 
person, other species, "man's" other, the other of the West, of 
Europe, of Being, of the "classic," of philosophy, of reason, etc. 
(The list goes on.)16 
Putting this foot forward makes deconstruction attractive, immensely 
so, for if God is included among "others," deconstruction (by this reading) 
looks a lot like religion; surely religion's object is to deliver us from narcis-
sistic self-centeredness into the otherness of God and (through God) other 
people.17 Deconstructionist prose swells with virtue, which is not surpris-
ing, given that it uses virtues - openness, and alternatively justice; 
Oerrida: "deconstruction is justice"18 - for its self-definitions. This makes 
things awkward for its critics, for their criticisms put them in the position 
of seeming to be against things that everybody wants; but the question is 
whether deconstruction's hermeneutical awe of the Other does more than 
preach the empathy we all aspire to? Do its claimed "skills" help us devel-
op and deploy that virtue? Are its practitioners more open to positions 
they disagree with than are other theorists? Its theological enthusiasts see 
in it "a rich and vigorous catalyst for religious thought [for being] an open 
ended call to let something new come; ... an approach that lets faith function 
with an enhanced sense of advent, gladdened by the good news of alterity 
by which we are summoned."19 But this sounds like using Christian con-
notations of Advent to bless modern enthusiasms for quantity, novelty, 
and progress - the more new arrivals the better. What if the newly wel-
comed guest turns out to be the Devil in disguise? Exactly how solicitous 
are we supposed to be when the "others" are skinhead Neo-Nazis and the 
Klu Klux Klan? Our hearts invariably go out to the downtrodden others 
that deconstructionists name, but have they discovered techniques to help 
us winnow hard cases? Obviously an infinite number of contrasts to, or 
negations of, any particular given are conceivable. Which warrant our 
attention, and which only distract us from our appointed course? 
This is no small question, but the deeper point is this. Deconstruction is 
above all a theory of language. This should temper our expectations right 
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off, for those theories come and go - structuralism, poststructuralism, gen-
erative grammar; what will be next? Two things, though, remain stable in 
the incessant parade. First, the deeper theorists dive into language, the big-
ger their problems become. A review of Randy Harris's recent book, The 
Linguistic Wars, concludes by quoting a linguist as saying, "You know, lan-
guage has got us licked. The score is language, one billion, linguists, zero."20 
The second constant in the ongoing procession is that theories of lan-
guage have little effect on the ideas that people use words to shape.21 
Caputo grants this, at least in part. 
To the age old dispute between belief and unbelief, deconstruction 
comes equipped with a kind of armed neutrality. [It] neither 
includes nor excludes existence of any positive entity .... There is 
nothing about deconstruction ... that affirms or falsifies the claims 
of faith; nothing that confirms or denies the claims of physiological 
reductionists who see there only the marvelous promptings not of 
the Spirit, but of certain neurotransmitters.22 
This claimed neutrality is deceptive, however, for in our materialistic 
age, deconstruction's "heightened sense of suspicion about the construct-
edness of our discourse" (Caputo) works more against intangibles than 
against neurotransmitters. Practically speaking, this places Derrida in the 
camp of the massed powers of cognition that oppose the human spirit 
today. When Saul Bellow tells us that 
the value of literature lies in "true impressions." A novel moves 
back and forth between the world of objects, of actions, of appear-
ances, and that other world, from which these "true impressions" 
come and which moves us to believe that the good we hang on to 
so tenaciously - in the face of evil, so obstinately - is no illusion,23 
- when (as I say) an artist expresses such views, religionists take him at 
his word but Derrida will not. His "heightened sense of suspicion" will 
not allow "presences" - his word for Bellow's "true impressions" - to be 
accepted at face value.24 
Some things need to be deconstructed. Scientism needs all the decon-
structing it can get, and the Buddha's deconstruction of the empirical ego 
by showing it to be a composite of skandas that derive from pratitya-samut-
pada (co-dependent origination) is a marvel of psychological analysis. But 
the Buddha tore down in order to rebuild; specifically to show that "utter 
[phenomenal] groundlessness (nonbeing) is equivalent to full grounded-
ness (being)."25 Likewise Pseudo-Dionysius. No one saw more clearly 
than he that 
the intelligence must interpret, correct, straighten out, "reduce," 
and deny the images, forms, and schemes in which are materially 
represented the divine realities they are unable to contain. [But 
this] radical critique and rejection by the intelligence of each of the 
[Divine] names that are more or less accessible to it indicate defi-
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nite steps fonvard of this same intelligence in the direction of its own 
divinization ."26 
One looks in vain for anything approaching such exalted issues from 
Derrida's dismantlings. They look like one more instance of our century-
long hermeneutics of suspicion, mounted this time linguistically. 
I fear that in giving the space that I have to Derrida my wish to come 
within hailing distance of at least one instance of postmodernism may have 
drawn me too far into its circle, for hand to hand combat never avails against 
these philosophers; their minds are too agile. So before proceeding to post-
modernism's religious alternative, I shall drop my dirk, back off a distance, 
and aim a javelin at the premises its philosophers work from. For in Yogi 
Berra's aphorism, they make the wrong mistake. Misjudging what our times 
require, they provide brilliant answers to the wrong question. To wit: 
Already at the opening of this century Yeats was warning that things 
were falling apart, that the center doesn't hold. Gertrude Stein followed 
him by noting that "in the twentieth century nothing is in agreement with 
anything else." Ezra Pound saw man as "hurling himself at indomitable 
chaos," and the most durable line from the play Green Pastures has been, 
"Everything that's tied down is coming loose." It is not surprising, there-
fore, that when in her last interview Rebecca West was asked to name the 
dominant mood of our time, she replied, "A desperate search for a pattern." 
The search is desperate because it seems futile to look for a pattern when 
reality has become, in Roland Barth's vivid image, kaleidoscopic. With 
every tick of the clock the pieces of experience come down in new array. 
This is what we are up against; this is what postmodernity is: the balka-
nization of life and thought. Perpetual becoming is preying on us like a 
deadly sickness, and (deaf to E. M. Forster's counsel, "only connect") post-
moderns think that more disconnections, more dismantlings and differ-
ences (and the increased fragmentation, distractions, and dispersions these 
produce) is what we need. If we could replay at fast speed a videotape of 
our century's social and conceptual earthquakes, we would see the decon-
structionists scurrying around like madmen in hardhats, frantically look-
ing for places where a little more demolition and destabilization might 
prove usefuJ.27 
Religion's Response to Postmodernism: 1. Worldviews Are Needed 
In turning now to postmodernism's religious alternative, I shall speak of 
it in the singular and simply assume what I argued in Forgotten Truth; 
namely, that a common metaphysical "spine" underlies the differences in 
the theologies of the classical languages of the human soul, the world's 
great religions. 28 Tackling in reverse order the three modes of postmod-
ernism that I earlier delineated, I shall report as straightforwardly as I can 
- there won't be much space to argue what I say - the religious claims 
that people need world views, that reliable ones are possible, and that they 
already exist. 
As religions on their conceptual sides are worldviews or metanarratives 
- inclusive posits concerning the ultimate nature of things - its custodians 
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cannot accept polemical postmodernism's contention that on balance they 
oppress. George Will has observed that "the magic word of modernity is 
'society"'; and the present case bears him out, for it is primarily for their 
social consequences that polemical postmoderns find worldviews harmfup9 
In applying that yardstick they simply assume (they do not argue) that reli-
gion does more harm than good. That this runs counter to social science 
functionalism, which holds that institulions don't survive unless they serve 
social needs, is conveniently overlooked/o but the deeper point is that the 
vertical dimension - the way religion feeds the human soul in its inward-
ness and solitariness - receives little attention. When the personal and pri-
vate dimension of life (which intersects the vertical) is validated, it is not dif-
ficult to see the function that worldviews serve. Minds require eco-niches 
as much as organisms do, and the mind's eco-niche is its worldview, its 
sense of the whole of things, however much or little that sense is articulated. 
Short of madness, there is some fit between the two, and we constantly try to 
improve the fit. Signs of a poor fit are the sense of meaninglessness, alien-
ation, and in acute cases anxiety, which postmodernity knows so well. The 
proof of a good fit is that life and the world make sense. When the fit feels 
perfect, the energies of the cosmos pour into the believer and empower her 
to startling degree. She knows that she belongs, and this produces an inner 
wholeness that is strong for being consonant with the wholeness of the AlP 
The very notion of an All is a red flag to deconstructionists for seeming to 
disallow alterity; and in a sense it does disallow it, for, being whole, God 
cannot be exclusive. But as God's inclusiveness is unique in including all 
the "otherness" there is - God's infinity is all-possibility - alterity is 
allowed as much room as it can conceivably have. 
One would think that postmodern theologians, at least, would honor 
this sense of ultimate belonging that religion bestows. Heirs, though, to 
modernity, they too have adopted "society" as their watchword, allowing 
social considerations to upstage ontological ones. Both absolutism and rel-
ativism have bright and shadow sides. The virtue of the Absolute is the 
power it offers the soul; its danger is the fanaticism into which that power 
can slip. In the case of relativism, its virtue is tolerance, and nihilism is its 
shadow side. Where social considerations predominate, it is the dark side 
of absolutism (fanaticism) and the bright side of relativism (tolerance) that 
are noticed, these being their social components. In both cases, the vertical 
dimensions - which would reverse our estimates of the two - are under-
played if not ignored. 
II. Worldviews Are Possible 
In proceeding from the need for world views to their possibility, I have 
in mind of course the possibility of valid world views, not castles in the air. 
The religious claim that the human mind has access to such views chal-
lenges mainline postmodernism in the way its preceding claim - that 
world views are needed - challenged its polemical version. 
Mainline postmodernism takes its stand on human finitude, arguing 
that as finite minds are no match for the infinite, there can be no fit 
between the two. What gets overlooked in this disjunction is the subtleties 
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that finitude admits of: its degrees, modes, and paradoxes. With its fana, 
anatta, and maya, religion in its highest registers denies that finitude, as 
such, fully exists. Postmodernism cannot comprehend that, any more than 
it can comprehend the other side of the paradox: that finitude hosts the 
imago dei, Atman, Buddha-nature, Uncreated Intellect, and Universal Man. 
God alone exists, and everything that exists is God. 
These are difficult concepts, so I reach for analogies. A wisp of spray is 
not the ocean, but the two are identically water. Or if we imagine an infinite 
lump of clay that tapers into tentacles and then into filaments that dwindle 
toward nothingness, the final tips of those filaments are still clay. To the reli-
gious spirit, such thoughts can serve as powerful springboards in suggesting 
our connectedness to God. Which connectedness - this is the immediate 
point - has epistemic implications. Postmoderns burlesque those who 
protest the cramped, postmodern view of the mind, charging them with 
claiming that humans can soar to a God's-eye view of things - as if omni-
science were the only alternative to Kant's categories. Worldviews are 
human views, which means that they conform to human modes of thought 
in the way a bird's-eye view of the world honors its modes. But Blake's dic-
tum is decisive here: "I see through my eyes, not with them." That the 
world, taken as the whole of things, looks different to God and other species 
than it does to us does not prevent there being better and worse, right and 
wrong ways that human beings take it to be. In a subordinate sense, the 
right way includes many right ways - as many as appropriately different 
ways of being human decree. Differe:t;lces in the world's great theologies 
provide an impressive instance of this, but here the point is that mistakes are 
possible and do occur, postmodernism being one of them. 
To be valid, an overview need not be complete. A photograph of the 
Himalayas can accurately portray their contours without including every 
crevasse, and it is only the contours of reality - more specifically, those 
that we need to discern in order to live wisely - that metanarratives seek 
to portray. 
The features of postmodern epistemology that most challenge their pro-
ject are two: perspectivalism carried to the point of absurdity, and a stunt-
ed reading of Kant. 
Perspectivalism becomes absurd when the obvious fact that we look at 
the world from different places, hence different angles, is transformed into 
the dogma that we therefore cannot know things as they actually are. For 
Kant, it was our human angle (the categories of the mind) that prevents us 
from knowing things in themselves; and when psychological, cultural, 
temporal, and linguistic filters are added to this generic one, we get con-
structivism, cultural relativism, historicism, and cultural-linguistic holism 
respectively. What dogmatic perspectivalism in all these modes overlooks 
is that to recognize that perspectives are such requires knowing in some 
way and to some extent the wholes that demote them to that status. 
Without such knowledge, each "take" (as they say in movie making) 
would be accepted as the thing itself. Visually, we need only move around 
the room to get a sense of the whole that shows our perspectives to be no 
more than that; but the mind is a dexterous instrument and can put itself 
"in other peoples' shoes," as we say.32 When the shoes belong to strangers, 
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we transcend cultural relativism; when they are removed in time we tran-
scend all-or-nothing historicism. When this is pointed out to postmoderns 
they again burlesque, charging their informants with claiming to be able to 
climb out of their skins, or (in the case of time) hop a helicopter for past 
epochs. Both images are self-serving by pointing their spatial referents in 
the wrong direction. The alternative to perspectivalism is not to get out of 
oneself but to delve into oneself until one reaches things that are timeless 
and elude space altogether. Postmodernism isn't interested in delving, 
however. To the question Jonathan Rabin poses for postmodern urban 
dwellers in Soft City - how can they get beneath surfaces to identify essen-
tial meanings? - David Harvey responds: "Postmodernism, with its resig-
nation to bottomless fragmentation and ephemerality, generally refuses to 
contemplate that question."33 
As for stunted Kantianism, it omits Kant's notion of ideas, of which 
there are three: I, God, and the world.34 Ideas differ from concepts in hav-
ing no ostensive, denotatable referents, but this precludes neither (a) their 
having referents that elude the senses, nor (b) our getting somewhere in 
thinking about them. In the case of world in its inclusive meaning - the 
concern of metanarratives - "getting somewhere" means using kataphatic 
language as fingers to point to the moon which stands for the supraformal 
Ultimate: call it Godhead, sunyata, Nirguna Brahman, the unspeakable Tao, 
whatever. If postmoderns know things about the ineffability of this 
Ultimate that escaped apophatic metaphysicians like Dionysius, Shankara, 
and Nagarjuna, that is too important a discovery to remain an in-house 
secret; they owe it to the rest of us to tell us plainly what it is. If, on the 
other hand, their critiques apply only to theologies that stop at the 
katophatic level, two points must be made. First, the critiques are redun-
dant in being aimed at targets that all the classical traditions in their full-
ness have relativized. Second, they fall short of the wisdom of those tradi-
tions in not giving the kataphatic its due - Heidegger, Wittgenstein and 
Derrida all fall under this charge. Without established first order religious 
discourse, the complex set of theological variations that constitute negative 
theology are impossible. The ascent of the spiritual intellect that apophatic 
theology is designed to launch cannot begin without a fairly well-ground-
ed conception of the divine, for without that there is nothing to invite the 
religious imagination to exceed and surpass. An established kataphatic 
theology is the prerequisite of apophasis. 
To return for a moment to the photograph of the Himalayas: From the 
traditional apophatic vantage point, world views are not so much replicas 
of, as guides to, the Ultimate. As such they can be true in the way a com-
pass can point to true north without - what would postmoderns have the 
compass do? Describe north? But postmoderns won't let us say such 
things, having put truth itself "on warning," or "called it into question."35 
(Ah, those arch, precious, supercilious, "in" locutions.) Wittgenstein pre-
figured the entire shift from modernity to postmodernity when he charac-
terized his turn from his early to his late period as a shift from truth to 
meaning. Here again the postmodern preoccupation with the social 
obtrudes, for the fanatical impulse to cram truth down other persons' 
throats leads postmoderns to back off from the notion generally, especially 
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if Truth is capitalized. In doing so they overlook the fact that truth is falli-
bilism's prerequisite, not its alternative. Where there is no via (way, truth) 
to deviate from, mistakes have no meaning.36 
III. Valid Worldviews Exist 
Working my way backwards through postmodernism's three versions, I 
come lastly to its minimal claim which simply reports that we have no 
believable world views today. "We have no maps, and we don't know 
how to make them," is the way one of the authors of The Good Society puts 
the point.37 
Whereas the two stronger versions of postmodernism needed to be chal-
lenged for interfering with the human spirit, this minimalist position, being 
at root a description, poses no real problem. The description can, though, 
be qualified somewhat. In saying that we have no maps, the "we" in the 
minimalist's assertion refers to Western intellectuals. Peoples whose 
minds have not been reshaped by modernity and its sequel continue to live 
by the maps of their revelations. 
We saw that polemical postmoderns (prone to assume that maps must 
be believed fanatically if they are believed at all) charge revelations with 
fomenting disharmony. Fundamentalism is their prime target; what they 
do not see is the extent to which they, as postmoderns, have engendered it. 
For political conservativism is not fundamentalism's deepest telos. Its 
deepest concern, which conservative politicians use to their advantage, is 
the threat of relativism and nihilism that postmodernism harbors. Here 
again the liberals' prioritizing of social consequences over religion's 
inward deliverances skews their perception of things. 
If mainline and polemical postmodernism were to recede, the obsession 
with life's social fabric that they saddle us with would relax and we would 
find ourselves able to think ontologically again. An important conse-
quence of this would be that we would then see how much religious out-
looks have in common. For one thing, they all situate the manifest, visible 
world within a whole that is largely invisible. Current cosmology provides 
a nice analogy for this, for dark matter doesn't impact any of science's 
detectors, and the current recipe for the universe is, "70 parts cold dark 
matter, about 30 parts hot dark matter, and just a pinch for all the rest -
the matter detectable to scientific instruments."J8 The further unanimous 
claim of religious cosmologies, though, finds no echo in science, for (being 
a value judgment) it is beyond science's reach. Not only is the invisible 
real. Regions of it are more real and of greater worth than is the visible 
world that echoes them. 
The inclusive, presiding paradigm for traditional cosmologies is a loose 
version of the Great Chain of Being, composed of links ranging in hierar-
chical order from meager existents up to the ens perfectissimum; and the 
foremost student of that concept, Arthur Lovejoy, reported that "most edu-
cated persons everywhere accepted [it] without question down to late in 
the eighteenth century" when scientism unhorsed it. 39 To that endorse-
ment, Ken Wilber has recently added that the Great Chain of Being is "so 
overwhelmingly widespread ... that it is either the single greatest intellectual 
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error ever to appear in humankind's history - an error so colossally wide-
spread as to literally stagger the mind - or it is the single most accurate 
reflection of reality yet to appear.""" 
Conclusion 
To propose that religions cash in the kataphatic, theological regions of 
their metanarratives for metaphysical similarities that they share would be 
as absurd as to urge people to peel off their flesh so the similarities of their 
skeletons could jump to light. But if the warfare between science and reli-
gion, and now postmodernism and religion, could wind down, religions 
might find themselves co-existing relatively happily within a minimally 
articulated meta narrative for the faith that infuses them all, much as the 
eight current models of the quantum world share the context of what 
quantum physicists in general agree on. Or in the way in which (in the 
modern period) competing scientific theories shared the metanarrative of 
the scientific worldview. 
Were this to happen, the atmosphere would be more salubrious, for I 
know no one who thinks that the postmodern view of the self and its 
makeshift world are nobler than the ones that the world's religions offer. 
Postmoderns acquiesce to their rundown views, not because they like 
them, but because they think that reason and human historicity now force 
them upon us. 
It has been the burden of my remarks that this is not the case. 
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